Liability Management Exercises in 2026: Market Data, Blockers, Case Law and How Lenders Review LME Risk

By the Continua Research Team · Published September 24, 2026 · Market data as of August 31, 2026

Disclosure: Continua, which publishes this guide, builds AI LME Analysis. Section 6 covers Continua and other named tools. Figures for other vendors come from their public materials and should be checked during procurement.

1. What Is a Liability Management Exercise?

A liability management exercise (LME) is an out-of-court process carried out within the terms of a borrower's existing financing documents. Through it, the borrower takes on new debt or reorganizes its existing debt [11]. In North American leveraged finance the same deals are often called liability management transactions (LMTs). The term usually covers moves that shift collateral or priority to benefit one creditor group at the expense of others [13].

The defining feature is that an LME is carried out within the consent thresholds of the finance documents. The borrower does not need every creditor to agree or a court to force a restructuring on dissenting creditors [11]. LMEs are used by both public companies and private-equity portfolio companies [8].

LMEs can create refinancing capacity and bring in new capital. Critics, however, point to their lack of transparency, backroom negotiation and doubtful legality. Some call them "lender-on-lender violence" because often only part of the creditor group benefits [12][11].

Working definition: an LME is a transaction in which a borrower restructures collateral, priority, maturity or other parts of its capital structure without a formal bankruptcy. It relies instead on the consent thresholds, baskets and exceptions already in its financing documents [11][13].

Common LME structures: uptier, drop-down, double-dip and more

Structure	How it works	Sources
Uptier / priming	A subset of lenders amends the financing documents and provides new money in exchange for a more senior position. Non-participating lenders are subordinated and may face much weaker recoveries later.	[13][11]
Drop-down	The borrower uses restricted-payment or investment capacity to move collateral, often IP or other "crown-jewel" assets, to an unrestricted subsidiary. That subsidiary then raises new debt against it.	[13][11]
Double-dip / pari-plus	A non-guarantor subsidiary raises new money and lends it to the restricted group for an intercompany receivable. The new lenders then have two claim paths: a parent guarantee and the receivable.	[13]
Amend & extend	Borrower and lenders amend the documents to extend maturities. It is the least controversial structure, but may not be enough in a deep distress case.	[13]
Discounted buyback	The borrower repurchases debt below par to capture the discount and de-lever.	[8]

Kirkland lists five common LME objectives: extend maturity, reduce cash debt service, capture discount / de-lever, raise new liquidity and relax covenants. It describes the process as: set objectives → legal and financial diligence → choose one or more transaction types [8].

LME glossary

Term	Meaning
LME / LMT	Out-of-court restructuring of liabilities or priority, done within the existing documents [11][13]
Priming / uptier	Creating debt that ranks ahead of existing debt for participating creditors [11]
Drop-down	Moving assets outside the restricted group so they can support new debt [11]
Double-dip / pari-plus	Using a non-guarantor financing structure to create a second claim path [13]
Open market purchase	An exception to pro rata sharing, read narrowly by the Fifth Circuit in Serta [14][15]
Pro rata sharing	Requires similarly placed lenders to be treated equally; often treated as a sacred right [14]
Sacred rights	Provisions that can only be changed with the consent of every lender, or every affected lender
Cooperation agreement	A lender pact to negotiate as a group and avoid side deals [13]
Blocker	Drafting that restricts a specific LME technique, e.g. J.Crew, Serta or Chewy blockers [14]
Distress ratio	Share of loans trading below 80 cents on the dollar [2]

2. LME Market Data 2026

2.1 Default activity as of August 2026

Metric	Latest value	Context	Source
Payment default rate, by amount	0.87%	Below the 5-year average (0.97%) and 10-year average (1.48%)	[1]
Payment default rate, by issuer count	1.17%	—	[1]
Dual-track default rate incl. LMEs, by count	2.88%	19 LME issuers vs. 33 in the 12 months to August 2025	[1]
Distress ratio	6.50%	Down 39 bps in August	[1]
LMEs, trailing 12 months	19	59% of defaults by count; 67% a year earlier; 73% peak in July 2024	[1]
August 2026 alone	2 LMEs, 1 payment default	—	[1]

All figures refer to the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index. Of the 19 trailing-12-month LMEs, healthcare providers and services accounted for five (26%), and software and IT services for two each [1].

Different trackers use different samples and periods, so their percentages should not be averaged. They do all point the same way.

Measure	Value	Period	Source
LMEs as share of defaults by count (PitchBook LCD)	59%	12 months to Aug. 2026	[1]
LMEs + distressed exchanges vs. payment defaults (PitchBook)	69% vs. 31%	12 months to Aug. 2025	[3]
LME share of combined defaults (KPMG)	66% (72% in LTM June 2025)	LTM Sept. 2025	[5]
LME share of total default activity (KPMG)	65%	Full-year 2025; peak 73% in LTM Feb. 2025	[6]
Combined default rate incl. distressed LMEs (KPMG)	3.35% (1.18% excl. LMEs)	Full-year 2025	[6]
LME share of default activity by count	9% → 74% peak	Jan. 2020 → July 2025	[7]
LMEs consummated (Kirkland data set)	45 in 2025 vs. 49 in 2024 (record)	Calendar years	[9]
Distressed LMEs with non-pro-rata outcomes	38	12 months to Dec. 2024 (21 in 2023, 9 in 2022)	[14]

On a rolling 12-month basis, LMEs and distressed exchanges have outnumbered payment defaults and bankruptcies in every month since January 2024 [3]. In 2023 it was the other way round [4].

2.3 Private credit: more stress, often through PIK

Metric	Value	Period	Source
Fitch U.S. Private Credit Default Rate	6.1% (6.0% in June)	12 months to July 2026	[10]
Mix of default events (Fitch)	PIK deferrals 50%, stressed maturity extensions 38%, uncured payment defaults 8%, bankruptcies 5%	12 months to July 2026	[10]
Private-credit borrowers with negative free cash flow	~40% (about 25% in 2021)	2026	[17]
Proskauer Private Credit Default Index	2.51% (2.73% in Q1)	Q2 2026; 716 loans, $195.6B	[24]
Private-credit defaults by borrower count / loan size (ACC)	3.7% / 1.4%	LTM Q1 2026	[25]
Distressed exchanges as share of D/SD downgrades (Morningstar DBRS)	94% (17 downgrades)	12 months to Feb. 2026	[26]
BDC non-accrual debt at cost (Octus)	$9.98B, up 40% QoQ; 2.01% reported, 3.24% adjusted	Q1 2026	[27]
Borrowers switching from cash to PIK (Octus)	32 borrowers, $1.3B principal	Q1 2026	[27]

The index rates differ because the samples and definitions differ. Fitch counts PIK deferrals and stressed extensions as defaults, while other indices focus on payment defaults. In private credit, the question often starts with a PIK switch or a covenant breach rather than a formal LME. The documents that decide the answer are the same: the credit agreement, the amendments and the voting provisions.

2.4 Named LME transactions in 2026

Borrower	Size	Structure / key terms	Source
Grupo Antolín	~€1.27B	Default option reinstates debt at par to 2035; voluntary option takes a 32.5% haircut for structurally senior debt with a higher cash coupon. A bondholder steering committee challenged the plan in the London High Court.	[18]
KWG Group	~$4.83B	Nine series of dollar notes plus bank debt converted into zero-coupon instruments under two options, with near-complete equitization and no cash coupons.	[18]
Synthomer	€300M RCF + UKEF facilities	Refinanced into new secured debt using permitted-lien capacity and unrestricted-subsidiary designations, subordinating €350M of senior unsecured notes due 2029.	[18]
Optimum Communications	$300M	Sold Series A preferred equity at an unrestricted subsidiary and used the proceeds for a tender offer for its common stock.	[18]
Athletico	~$750M debt reduction	$80M of new capital; ~$390M term loan remains in the index.	[1]
Foundever	~$900M debt reduction	$225M of new equity; $1.4B term loan B remains in the index.	[1]
Cable One / MBI	—	Exchange terms depended on how fast lenders responded. Acceptances reached only about 33.4% as a lender co-op grew past 65%, and the company said it was considering not completing the exchange.	[18]

3. LME Blockers in 2026: J.Crew, Serta, Chewy and Beyond

Protection / flexibility	Value	Period and sample	Source
At least one Serta-, J.Crew- or Chewy-style protection	89% of sampled agreements	Moody's, Nov. 2024	[14]
J.Crew blocker in new loans	83% all / 79% PE-backed (Q4 2025: 76% / 80%)	Loans cleared in Q1 2026, Covenant Review sample	[20]
Amendments need all affected lenders (Serta tranche voting)	75.4% all / 68.8% PE-backed (Q4 2025: 71.1% / 72.9%)	Q1 2026, Covenant Review	[20]
At least one LME protection added or tightened in syndication	33% of deals; J.Crew 20%, Serta 18%, Chewy 18%	H1 2026, Octus	[19]
J.Crew blocker in non-sponsored high-yield bonds	27% (14% in 2025)	H1 2026, 9fin	[21]
Uncapped EBITDA add-backs allowed	32% (45% in Q4 2025)	Q1 2026, Covenant Review	[20]
MFN sunset	57% (50% in Q4 2025)	Q1 2026, Covenant Review	[20]
Pro rata sharing provisions / lien-subordination requirements	85% of syndicated loans / 61% of new issues	American Banker, 2025	[16]
J.Crew blocker (different sample)	11% → 36%	Q1 2023 → Q2 2025, American Banker	[16]
Europe: J.Crew / Chewy blocker	>2/3 / ~40% of loan deals reviewed	2024, ION Analytics	[22]

How to read the J.Crew figures: the 83% (Covenant Review) and 36% (American Banker) come from different samples and definitions. They are not two points on the same trend line. Covenant Review measures institutional loans that cleared in the quarter.

Other 2026 signals point the same way:

Lender pushback during syndication: lenders won material covenant changes in 59% of U.S. leveraged loans Octus tracked in H1 2026. That rose to 63% in Q2 and 83% for LBOs [19].
Catch-all blockers: 9fin reports that J.Crew, Serta and Chewy blockers were near-standard in H1 2026 U.S. leveraged loans, and two sponsored deals included catch-all LME blockers [21].
Europe: anti-Serta, Envision and double-dip blockers have started to appear in term sheets and facility agreements [22].
Documentation quality: the average Covenant Review Documentation Score weakened to 3.84 in March 2026 from 3.66 in February, on a scale from 1 (most protective) to 5 (least protective) [20].

From "is there a blocker?" to "which baskets are excluded?" A May 11, 2026 commitment and consent letter for Accendra Health, filed with the SEC as an exhibit to a Form 8-K, includes a General LME Blocker. It defines "Liability Management Transaction" and restricts guarantor releases made in connection with, or in anticipation of, an LME. It also expressly bars the Shared Non-Loan Party Cap, the General Debt Basket, the General Liens basket and a dedicated lien basket from being used for an LME [23].

That is the right level of detail. Moody's has cautioned that blocker language can create a false sense of security because the protections are narrow and have loopholes [14]. The useful question is: what does this blocker actually prevent, and what does it leave open?

4. LME Case Law: Serta, Mitel and Incora

Case	What happened	Why it matters for document review	Source
Serta (2020 uptier)	$200M of new-money super-priority loans plus an exchange of $1.2B of existing loans into about $875M of super-priority debt. The bankruptcy court sided with Serta in 2023; the Fifth Circuit reversed at the end of 2024, holding that the deal was not an "open market purchase".	The exact wording of the open market purchase exception and the pro rata sharing provisions	[15][13][14]
Mitel (2020 uptier)	$150M of new super-priority debt plus an exchange into new second-out and third-out loans. In 2025 the New York Appellate Division dismissed the challenge: no sacred right was directly amended, and the pro rata exception allowed any "purchase by way of assignment".	Small drafting differences, such as "open market purchase" versus "purchase by way of assignment", lead to opposite outcomes	[15]
Incora / Wesco	Judge Isgur rejected a multi-step strategy: issue new notes to reach a two-thirds vote, release liens, then exchange into new secured notes.	Consent thresholds, lien-release mechanics and incremental issuance must be read together	[14]

These decisions put open market purchase, pro rata sharing, sacred rights, lien releases and consent mechanics at the center of every LME review. They are also the provisions most likely to be spread across the definitions, the amendments section and later amendments.

5. What an LME Review Has to Cover

A useful LME review answers five questions across the complete agreement family: the credit agreement, every amendment, incremental joinders, the guarantee and collateral agreement, and the intercreditor.

Protection map. Which protections apply today (drop-down, uptier, non-pro-rata, guarantee release, double-dip, pari-plus), and is each one present, partial or not found?
Amendment chain. Which amendment added, narrowed or removed each protection? For version-by-version changes, see AI Document Comparison.
Baskets and capacity. Which investment, debt, lien and designation baskets could fund an LME, exactly as written, including EBITDA-based growers?
Voting and sacred rights. What is the Required Lenders threshold, which rights need every lender or every affected lender, and could incremental debt change the vote?
Conflicts and gaps. Where do definitions, covenants and related agreements disagree? Both sides should stay visible rather than one being silently chosen.

Why generic AI workflows struggle with this

Failure mode	What it looks like in LME review	Source
Sampling misses the decisive clause	Top-k retrieval returns a few chunks. A definition, schedule or amendment that changes the answer can be skipped.	[46]
The agreement family does not fit	Upload and context limits can bind before the base agreement, amendments and collateral documents are read together (see ChatGPT's file upload limits).	[47]
Hallucination	Generative AI can produce fluent but wrong text. Lenders should ask whether outputs are grounded in the loan documents and what guardrails exist.	[40]
Ambiguity	AI performs best with clear rules. It struggles with ambiguity, incomplete information and new situations, which are common in LME analysis.	[41]

When you evaluate any tool, the four things that matter most are coverage, working context, citation integrity and preserving contradictions. Being able to upload a PDF is not enough.

6. AI Tools for LME and Covenant Review in 2026

These tools solve related but different problems. Capabilities, security and pricing below come from each vendor's public materials. "Not disclosed" means the cited materials did not say, not that the capability is absent.

Continua — AI LME Analysis (our product)

Reviews the credit agreement, amendments, incremental joinders, guarantee and collateral agreement and intercreditor together. It produces an LME protection map covering J.Crew, Envision, Pluralsight, Serta, non-pro-rata, NYDJ, Chewy, At Home, Incora and omni-blocker protections, each with its section and page. It quotes the governing language, lists exceptions, names the amendment that introduced or changed each protection, and labels inference separately from document fact [42]. It works on uploaded documents, including private, bilateral and club deals that are not publicly filed [42]. More in Section 7.

Octus — CreditAI and CovenantAI

Covenant analysis trained by Octus's legal and financial analysts to spot LME vulnerabilities such as uptiering and drop-downs. It uses more than a dozen agents and over 10,000 prompts [28]. Answers include a validation trail back to the source, with permissioned public and private content. SOC 2 certified [29][30]. Pricing not disclosed.

9fin — Covenant Explorer

Lawyer-validated covenant data for leveraged loans and high-yield bonds. Supports benchmarking across 100+ data points and side-by-side document comparison, with AI answers grounded in 9fin's source materials [31]. Pricing and certifications not disclosed in the cited materials.

ExactCov

Extracts covenants, baskets and thresholds from indentures, LMA/LSTA credit agreements, intercreditors and amendments, with clause citations. It maps debt, lien and restricted-payment capacity and assesses priming, drop-down, uptiering and cross-default exposure [32]. Offers zero data retention, UK/EU/US data residency, SSO and VPC/on-prem deployment. It also ships as an MCP server and Skills for Claude, ChatGPT Enterprise and Microsoft 365 Copilot [32]. Enterprise pricing is per name in scope, with a four-week parallel run before signing [33].

Ontra — Insight for Credit

Covenant abstraction, term comparison across facilities, obligation tracking and event-triggered default checks for private-markets firms [34]. SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 27001:2022, with zero data retention [34]. A 30-day trial is available to qualified firms [35].

CovenantFlow, CovenantIQ and Crisil Covenant Guard

These three focus on covenant monitoring and compliance rather than LME protection analysis:

CovenantFlow extracts covenants and flags early warning signals, with integrations into nCino, Loan IQ and Abrigo. SOC 2 Type II is in progress [36].
CovenantIQ maps covenants to normalized borrower financials and produces source-linked calculations. SOC 2 Type II [37].
Crisil Covenant Guard is a service-led covenant repository with a full audit trail. A cited case study reports 60% time savings across 250+ documents a quarter [38][39].

At a glance

Tool	Main focus	Complete agreement family + LME protection map	Page / clause citations	Public security signals
Continua	Evidence investigation across uploaded documents	✅	✅	Zero document retention; HIPAA-ready; no training on customer data [49][51]
Octus CreditAI / CovenantAI	Credit research + agentic covenant analysis	Uptier / drop-down vulnerability analysis	Validation trail to source	SOC 2 [29]
9fin Covenant Explorer	Covenant data and benchmarking	Benchmarking across 100+ data points	Grounded answers	Not disclosed
ExactCov	Covenant register + capacity analysis	Priming, drop-down, uptier, cross-default	Clause citations	Zero data retention, residency, VPC [32]
Ontra Insight for Credit	Abstraction + obligation management	Term comparison, default checks	—	SOC 2 Type 2, ISO 27001 [34]
CovenantFlow / CovenantIQ / Crisil	Covenant monitoring and compliance	Not the primary focus	Source-linked calculations (CovenantIQ)	See above

What to test in a proof of concept

Use a real agreement family where the right answer depends on a clause that is easy to miss. Ask each vendor to show:

Coverage: did it read every document in the family, including amendments and the intercreditor?
Amendment chain: can it show which amendment changed a protection, and quote the current language?
Citations: does every material finding link to a page you can open?
Boundaries: does it show what a blocker leaves open, not just whether one exists?
Contradictions: when two provisions disagree, does it keep both sides visible?
Private deals and data handling: does it work on bilateral and club deals that are not publicly filed, and what happens to your files after the task?

7. How Continua Reviews LME Risk

What goes in: the full agreement family — base agreement, amendments, incremental joinders, guarantee and collateral agreement, intercreditor and any related indenture. Formats are PDF, DOCX, XLSX and CSV [42].

What comes out: a cited LME protection report [42] with:

each protection's status, governing language, scope and exceptions;
the amendment that introduced or changed each protection;
the Required Lenders threshold, sacred rights and relevant baskets, listed exactly as written;
document facts kept separate from inference, with unresolved ambiguities preserved.

An illustrative finding. A J.Crew blocker added by amendment restricts transfers of Material Intellectual Property. It does not expressly restrict designating a subsidiary that already owns that IP as unrestricted. It does not address exclusive licences. And the Borrower decides what counts as material. So the protection exists, but only partly [42]. (This is an illustrative example with fictional section numbers.) See a sample LME protection map.

Capacity. Continua lists baskets exactly as written, including fixed amounts and EBITDA-based growers. If you provide current EBITDA it can estimate capacity, with assumptions labelled separately [42].

Why coverage matters. Continua is designed to read 100% of the pages in the document set, with up to a 1 billion-token effective working context, rather than sampling chunks [46]. Where two documents disagree, it keeps both sides cited instead of silently picking one (AI Contradiction Finder) [44].

Benchmarks (published by Continua, not independent). Every run used the same file pile, prompt, model weights and grader, with blind scoring and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals [43]. The two results most relevant to LME work:

Benchmark	Continua + Claude Opus 5	Continua + GPT 5.6 Sol	Continua + Gemini 3.7 Flash	vs. standard retrieval
Citation integrity under amendment chains (unsupported claims, lower is better)	0.4 ± 0.2	0.6 ± 0.3	0.9 ± 0.3	6.8 → 0.4 (−94%)
Acquisition due diligence (score)	91.2% ± 3.1	89.4% ± 3.4	87.1% ± 3.8	52.6% → 91.2% (+38.6 pts)

Full methodology and all five benchmarks: Continua benchmarks [43].

What it does not do. Continua does not predict whether an LME will happen. It shows what the documents permit and restrict [42]. It is not legal advice, a covenant research subscription or a credit decision engine [42][48].

Data handling. Uploaded files are deleted after the task unless you intentionally add them to a Project. Customer documents, prompts and task data are not used to train models [51][49][50]. Enterprise plans add private cloud / VPC, SSO and audit controls [49]. See Trust & Security.

Related workflows. For the full borrower package, see AI Finance Underwriting [48]. For annual reviews and renewals, see AI Credit Review. For risk ranking, see AI Risk & Red Flags [45].

Try it on your own documents: upload a credit agreement family and run a free LME protection review. Then run the same question in the general-purpose AI you already use, and compare the results against the checklist in Section 6.

FAQ

What is a liability management exercise?

A liability management exercise (LME) is an out-of-court transaction in which a borrower restructures its debt within the terms of its existing financing documents. Typical moves are raising new debt that ranks ahead of existing lenders or moving assets outside their collateral. It relies on consent thresholds and baskets instead of unanimous consent or a bankruptcy process.

Is an LME a default?

Many market trackers count distressed LMEs as default events. PitchBook's dual-track default rate for the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index includes them and was 2.88% by issuer count in August 2026, compared with a 1.17% payment default rate.

What is the difference between an uptier and a drop-down?

In an uptier, a group of lenders amends the documents to create new debt that ranks ahead of the existing loans. In a drop-down, the borrower moves assets to an unrestricted subsidiary, which raises new debt against those assets outside the existing lenders' collateral.

What are J.Crew, Serta and Chewy blockers?

They are drafting protections named after well-known LMEs. A J.Crew blocker restricts moving material assets, often IP, to unrestricted subsidiaries. A Serta blocker restricts subordinating lenders' liens or payment priority without their consent. A Chewy blocker restricts releasing a guarantor just because it stops being wholly owned.

Do LME blockers fully protect lenders?

Not always. Moody's has warned that blocker language can create a false sense of security because protections are often limited in scope and have loopholes. Each blocker needs to be read together with the definitions, baskets and amendments that decide its real scope.

Can AI review LME protections in a credit agreement?

Yes, if the tool reads the complete agreement family, traces the amendment chain, cites every material finding to a page and keeps conflicting provisions visible. The results support, but do not replace, review by credit teams and counsel.

Sources

Market data and research

PitchBook — Leveraged loan default rate dips further to 0.87%; distress ratio eases (Aug. 2026)
PitchBook — Leveraged loan default rate dips below 1% in June, though distress ratio rises (June 2026)
PitchBook — Leveraged loan default rate ticks higher in August while rate including LMEs eases (Aug. 2025)
PitchBook — Leveraged loan default rate holds steady at 0.82% by amount, LMEs remain in focus
KPMG Corporate Finance — Credit Markets Update Q3 2025
KPMG Corporate Finance — Credit Markets Update Q4 2025
Q3 2025 Leveraged Loan Market Overview (PDF)
Kirkland & Ellis — Spotlight: Liability Management Exercises (Dec. 2023)
Kirkland & Ellis — The Bring Down Market Update (Jan. 2026)
Kirkland & Ellis — The Bring Down Market Update (Sept. 2026), citing Fitch
Ashurst — Liability management exercises: Trends, risks and opportunities
ECGI — Introducing the Corporate Restructuring Machine: An Open Platform Approach
ABI — Liability Management Transactions: The Beginning of the End?
GARP — Liability Management Exercises Continue After Courts Have Had a Say, citing Moody's and PitchBook LCD
Jones Day — Uptiers in 2025: Impact of the Serta and Mitel Decisions on Liability Management Exercises
American Banker — AI in lending can shut down sneaky liability management schemes
Huron — Liability management exercises in private credit
Octus — Global Liability Management Quarterly Overview 2026
Octus — US Leveraged Loans Pushback Debut Tracker Insights
CreditSights / Covenant Review — CR TrendLines: Loan Covenant Trends, April 2026
9fin — US Covenant Trends Report H1 26: Leveraged Loans and High Yield Bonds
ION Analytics — The rise of LME blockers in Europe: Valuable protection or an empty gesture?
SEC EDGAR — Accendra Health, Inc., Commitment and Consent Letter (Exhibit 10.1 to Form 8-K, May 11, 2026)
Proskauer — Private Credit Default Index: 2.51% for Q2 2026
ACC / AIMA — Private Credit Q1 2026 Quarterly Update
Morningstar DBRS — Private credit defaults accelerating, led by distressed exchanges
Octus — BDC Weekly Roundup: Nonaccruals Jump 40% Sequentially

Vendors

Octus — Octus Unveils a Unified CreditAI Experience
Octus — CreditAI
Octus — CovenantAI
9fin — LevFin
ExactCov — AI Covenant Extraction & Analysis
ExactCov — Pricing
Ontra — Insight for Credit
Ontra — Insight for Credit free trial
CovenantFlow
CovenantIQ
Crisil Integral IQ — Covenant Guard
Crisil Integral IQ — Covenant monitoring for existing loan agreements
Baseline — How to Select Private Lending Software in the Age of AI
UK Parliament — Written evidence, Dr Swati Sachan, University of Liverpool Management School

Continua

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